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Mike Cheetham
This paper develops, extends, and clarifies themes introduced in five prior papers1
dealing with blockchain, and VATCoin in the context of both (a) the new VATs in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), and (b) the mature VATs in the EU.2 Five additional papers on
VAT technology advances in Fiji,3 with blockchain and VATCoin applications to New Zealand’s
approach to online sales platforms (the Netlix Tax) are similarly referenced and extended.4
The GCC VAT papers were exploratory. For the most part, they were composed before
any GCC jurisdiction had implemented a VAT,5 and in three instances even before the GCC
Framework Agreement was officially published.6 Today, VATs have been adopted in three of
the six GCC jurisdictions: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. A fourth jurisdiction, Oman, had
been only a few months away from implementation, but now is delayed.7 As to the EU, the prior

Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohabi, Mike Cheetham, & Camille Tirand, A VATCoin Solution to MTIC
Fraud: Past Efforts, Present Technology and the EU’s 2017 Proposal, 89 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 335
(JANUARY 22, 2018); Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT: GCC
Solves MTIC Fraud, 86 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695 (May 22, 2017); Richard T. Ainsworth, & Musaad
Alwohabi, Blockchain, Bitcoin and VAT in the GCC: the Missing Trader Example, 14 TAX PLANNING
INTERNATIONAL INDIRECT TAXES 7, (December 2016); Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohabi & Mike
Cheetham, VATCoin: Can a Crypto Tax Currency Prevent VAT Fraud? 84 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 703
(November 16, 2016); Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, GCC VAT: The Intra-Gulf Trade Problem, 84
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 315 (OCTOBER 17, 2016).
2 The member state of the Gulf Cooperation Council are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates.
3 Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Fiji: A Digital Invoice System Fights Fraud and Enforces Real-Time VAT
Compliance, 92 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 697 (November 12, 2018).
4 In four parts: Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First, Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s
NetFlix Tax (Part 1) 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 159 (April 8, 2019); (Part 2), 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL
319 (April 22, 2019); (Part 3) & (Part 4) forthcoming.
5 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates both adopted a VAT on January 1, 2018; Bahrain
adopted a VAT on January 1, 2019; Kuwait is expected to adopt a VAT at an undetermined date 2021; Oman plans
on adopting a VAT by September 1, 2019; and Qatar is expected to adopt a VAT some time in 2020.
6 The text of the GCC Framework Agreement was published April 21, 2017 in UM AL-QURA (the Official Gazette
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) dated 1438/7/24 on the Islamic calendar. It can be found in Gazette number 4667.
Available (in Arabic) at: http://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/1492752507552176200. The related Royal Decree is
No.M/51,3/5/1438H (2017) and can also be found (in Arabic) at:
http://www.uqn.gov.sa/articles/1492752507542176100/. Musaad Alwohaibi confirmed all Arabic-English
translation used in this paper are accurate. They were derived, with the assistance of Deloitte, from their basic
translation framework in the following document: The Unified VAT Agreement for the Cooperation Council for the
Arab States of the Gulf – A Bilingual Replication (available at:
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/tax/me_Deloitte-english-GCC-VAT-Treatytranslation-May-7.pdf
7 Oman had been scheduled to introduce its VAT in September 2019, but has delayed until January 1, 2021. Richard
Asquith, Oman delays VAT til 2021, AVALARA VAT LIVE (July 30, 2019), available at:
https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/vat-news/oman-delays-vat-till-2021.html.
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papers directly responded to the request for public comment on the Commission’s October 4,
2017 proposal for “far reaching reforms” in the EU VAT.8
PRE-CONDITION TO MODERNIZATION – THE DIGITAL INVOICE
All cutting-edge VAT compliance regimes depend on a comprehensive, naturally
occurring or mandated digital invoice regime.9 Whether the goal is to blockchain an entire VAT
ecosystem (as in Fiji),10 or a discrete market segment like taxi cabs (in Quebec), 11 or the
marijuana supply chain (as is proposed for US States),12 or the remote sales of services through
online marketplaces (as is proposed for New Zealand’s Netflix Tax),13 or cigarettes that are
susceptible to smuggling (as was proposed, and partially adopted in parts of the GCC),14 or
EU Commission, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE - On the follow-up to the Action Plan on VAT Towards a
single EU VAT area - Time to act COM (2017) 566 final available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/communication_-_towards_a_single_vat_area_en.pdf;
Press Release – European Commission, European Commission proposes far-reaching reform of the EU VAT system
(October 4, 2017) IP/17/3443, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3443_en.htm; COMMISSION
STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT – IMPACT ASSESSMENT, accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards harmonizing and simplifying certain rules in the value added tax
system and introducing the definitive system for the taxation of trade between Member States, SWD(2017) 325 final
(October 4, 2017) at 11, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2017/EN/SWD-2017-325F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF
9 Although the mandated digital invoice (see Fiji) is the most common permutation, there are naturally occurring
markets where digital invoices are the commercial norm (consider some of the highly fraud prone areas like sales of
low value goods or remotely supplied services through online marketplaces, the gas and electric markets, or the
formerly the taxable sale of EU emissions permits). Naturally occurring digital sectors of the economy are the ideal
place for pilot projects. This is the case with Quebec’s pilot project of a cloud-based and fully software-driven
system (systèmes d’enregistrement des ventes, or SEV) for taxi cabs. The SEV invoices are a digital replica of the
hardware-driven module d’enregistrement des ventes or MEV, which had been (and still is) used in bars and
restaurants.
10 Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Fiji: A Digital Invoice System Fights Fraud And Enforces Real-Time
VAT Compliance, 92 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 697 (November 12, 2018)
11 The pilot will begin in July 2019, involve 50 drivers, and end in January 2020. Jean-Phillippe Guilbault,
Mandatory Invoicing in Taxis: A Pilot Project will be Launched in July [Facturation obligatoire dans les taxis: un
projet pilote sera lancé en juillet], (November 23, 2018) https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1137750/taxi-facturerevenu-quebec-evasion-fiscale-projet-pilote; Revenue Quebec, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS - Mandatory
invoicing in the transport sector paid people [ANALYSE D’IMPACT RÉGLEMENTAIRE - Facturation obligatoire dans le
secteur du transport rémunéré de personnes], (September 2017) available at:
http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/documents/AccesInfo/fr/AINFR_AIR_FacturationObligatoireTransportRemunere.p
df (French)
12 Richard T. Ainsworth and Brendan Magauran, Taxing and Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance and
Trump (Part 1) 88 STATE TAX NOTES 241 (April 16, 2018); (Part 2) 88 STATE TAX NOTES 419 (April 30, 2018);
(Part 3) 88 STATE TAX NOTES 1213 (June 18, 2018); (Part 4) 89 STATE TAX NOTES 39 (July 2, 2018); and (Part 5)
89 STATE TAX NOTES 157 (July 9, 2018)
13 Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix Tax,”
(Part 1), 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 159 (April 8, 2019); (Part 2), 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 319 (April
22, 2019); (Part 3) forthcoming; (Part 4) forthcoming.
14 Both KSA and the UAE have adopted this system. General Authority of Zakat & Tax, Tax Stamp System:
Timelines for Application of Tax Stamp System on Cigarettes
31 May 2019: Application of tax stamp system on imported cigarettes.
23 August 2019: Imported cigarettes that do not bear activated proper tax stamps will not be allowed
into the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia].
8
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whether the goal is to monitor the tax and financial flows on the other side of a transaction, the
domestic and cross-border payments of VAT (as has been proposed with VATCoin in both the
GCC and the EU),15 everything starts with the adoption of the digital invoice.
This paper will focus on two representative VAT jurisdictions within different economic
communities – the United Kingdom (UK) in the EU and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in
the GCC. Both are moving toward the adoption of comprehensive digital invoices. Neither have
mandated it (yet). It is certainly not a naturally occurring phenomenon in either country.
At the community level – there is EU and GCC evidence of movement toward universal
digital invoicing. In both the EU and the GCC there is a clear sense that comprehensive digital
invoicing is coming. There is a broad movement to digitize commerce. Parallel tax-based
digitization developments are abundant. For example, separate European countries (Portugal, 16
Poland,17 Lithuania,18 Spain,19 Hungary,20 Italy,21 and Norway22) have all adopted some form of
digital invoicing. But, the adoption is rarely comprehensive, and not often mandated. There is

18 November 2019: Sale of and trade in cigarettes that do not bear activated proper tax stamps will
not be allowed in the Kingdom.
https://www.gazt.gov.sa/en/tax-stamp-system
Shisha in UAE to require ‘Digital Tax Stamp’ from November, (July 10, 2019) GULF NEWS (Business)
https://gulfnews.com/business/shisha-in-uae-to-require-digital-tax-stamp-from-november-1.65148817
15 Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi, Mike Cheetham & Camille Tirand, A VATCoin Solution to MTIC
Fraud: Past Efforts, Present Technology, and the EU’s 2017 Proposal, 89 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 335
(January 22, 2018). Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact, Blockchain Might solve VAT Fraud, 83 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 1165 (September 26, 2016)
16 Effective January 1, 2019 Portugal required all business-to-government transactions to be e-invoiced. Digital
invoices must be transmitted automatically through the tax administration’s invoicing platform. Since 2008 Portugal
has required companies with a permanent establishment to keep SAF-T complaint records, available on request.
Since 2013 a digital (SAF-T compliant) list of all purchase and sales invoices must be submitted monthly.
17 In 2018 Poland began requiring all VAT-registered enterprises to submit monthly a SAF-T digital file that records
all transactions, and the amount of VAT paid, refunded, or carried forward.
18 In October 2016 Lithuania began requiring every VAT-registered person to file SAF-T data from all sales and
purchase invoices to the tax authority by the 20th day after the reporting month.
19 On July 2, 2017 Spain implemented the Suministro Inmediato de Información del IVA, or SII system (Immediate
Supply of Information on VAT) which requires taxpayers to transmit invoice data (in XML format) to the tax
administration within four calendar days from the date of the transaction [that is, the invoice date for sales or the
accounting entry date for purchases]. SII is mandatory for all VAT taxpayers filing monthly returns.
20 On July 1, 2018 Hungary’s real-time reporting obligation came into effect for all VAT taxpayers. Hungary’s rules
do not apply to purchases, or to intra-community supplies (or acquisitions) or exports. Taxpayers have 24-hours to
transmit sales data in XM to the tax authority.
21 Italy has designed a mandatory electronic invoicing and clearance regime. In March 2015 Italy mandated einvoicing for all B2G transactions, and then by July 1, 2016 for all agreements between the main contractor and
subcontractors on a government account. On the same day all motor fuels (gasoline station sales) were required to
use e-invoices. On December 27, 2017 e-invoicing is applied to B2B and B2C transactions. But further, the Budget
Law 2018 (Law No. 25 of December 27, 2017) also required suppliers to clear transactions through a state-operated
exchange platform (but not if the supplier was not established in Italy). A specific XML format is specified. If the
invoice is not submitted according to specification it will be voided by the tax authority (penalties apply). Invoices
must be submitted immediately (real-time).
22 Since 2014 Norwegian taxpayers have been able to file SAF-T reports, but as of January 1, 2020 these e-reports
must be available on-demand.
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an exception – digital invoices are nearly mandated in full in the EU when they are B2G.23
There is no similar, GCC-wide rule.
There is a particularly notable companion development in many jurisdictions (globally
considered) that gives credence to the broader movement – governments are demanding digital
reporting of critical tax information with SAF-T (Standard Audit File in Tax).24 SAF-T
reporting is sometimes joined with and at other times independent of digital invoicing rules. In
many jurisdictions, SAF-T reporting, like digital invoices, runs the gambit from real-time, to on
demand, to time-delayed reporting. Thus, the movement to digital tax information reporting is
widespread, slow moving, and irregular.
In the EU the need for digitally harmonized invoicing and record retention is well
recognized. The Second Invoicing Directive in 2010 endeavored to resolve harmonization issues
in invoicing, but did not.25 A Third Invoicing Directive was asked for almost immediately. 26
Argentina since July 1, 2015 mandatory for all taxpayers; Austria since January 1, 2014 for B2G only;
Azerbaijan mandatory for all taxpayers since January 1, 2010; Belarus mandatory for all taxpayers since July 1,
2015; Bolivia mandatory for certain categories of taxpayers since January 2016; Brazil mandatory for goods,
transportation services starting at various times from April 2010 through November 2014; Chile mandatory in stages
from November 1, 2014 through February 1, 2018; Colombia mandatory for all taxpayers since December 2017;
Costa Rica mandatory for all taxpayers since March 15, 2017; Denmark, mandatory for B2G transactions since
2005; Ecuador mandatory for certain categories of taxpayers since August 1, 2014; Finland mandatory for B2G
transactions since January 1, 2010; France mandatory for B2G transactions since January 1, 2017; Guatemala
mandatory for all taxpayers since March 1, 2013; Iceland mandatory for B2G transactions since January 1, 2015;
Indonesia mandatory for all corporate taxpayers since July1, 2014; Kazakhstan mandatory for taxpayers engaged in
international activity since July 1, 2016; South Korea mandatory for all taxpayers since January 2014; Mexico
mandatory for all taxpayers since May 2013; Moldova mandatory for B2G since September 1, 2014; Netherlands
mandatory for B2G since January 1, 2017; Norway mandatory for B2G since July 1, 2012; Peru various rules since
January 1, 2015; Singapore mandatory for B2G since May 2008; Slovenia mandatory for B2G since January 1,
2015; Switzerland mandatory for B2G since January 1, 2016; Taiwan mandatory for certain sectors since January 1,
2015; Tunisia mandatory for B2G since January 1, 2016; Turkey mandatory in certain categories since January 1,
2014; Ukraine mandatory for all taxpayers since January 1, 2015; Uruguay mandatory for all taxpayers in stages,
since June 1, 2016. TrustWeaver, Tax-Compliant global Electronic invoice lifecycle Management (February 2018)
available at: https://docplayer.net/26215019-Tax-compliant-global-electronic-invoice-lifecycle-managementeuropean-e-invoicing-service-providers-association.html
24 SAF-T is an international standard for electronic exchange of reliable accounting data from organizations to a
national tax authority (or external auditors). The standard is defined by the OECD. Although SAF-T is formally
standardized, both with respect to syntax (format) and semantics (meaning) to allow for and fulfill automatic data
interchange and tools support, it does include some room for revenue bodies (tax administrations) to add individual
elements, e.g. to cover special needs in a taxation or audit system.
25 Second Invoicing Directive on July 13, 2010 [Council Directive 2010/45/EU 2010 O.J. (L 189) 1]
26 Richard T. Ainsworth, Stopping EU VAT Fraud With a Third Invoicing Directive, 71 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL
545 (August 5, 2013); Gorka Echevarria Zubeldia, The Second EU Invoicing Directive: A Missed Opportunity,
Nov./Dec. INT. VAT MONITOR 417 (2010) (itemizing how the Second Invoicing Directive has fallen short on its
promise of simpler and more harmonized rules in invoicing); Patrick Wille, New EU Rules on Invoicing, Jan./Feb.
INT. VAT MONITOR 6 (2011) (discussing simplified invoices, cash accounting and the continuing requirement that
customers control the use of e-invoices); Isabelle Desmeyiere, The Hidden Features of EU Invoicing Directive
2010/45, Nov./Dec. INT. VAT MONITOR 400 (2011) (explaining how new rules on the chargeability of VAT in
instances where the related invoice has not been issued will lead to complexities when States exercise differing
options, and the complexities that may result from further development of the cash accounting option); Joep J. P.
Swinkels, Confusing EU VAT Invoices from 2013, May/Jun. INT. VAT MONITOR 174 (2012) (explaining how the
large number of official languages in the EU and the compulsory clauses on invoices may cause confusion
particularly in cases where a small business under cash accounting sells to a larger business).
23

4
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574381

The Second Directive took some necessary baby steps. It did expressly equate paper and digital
invoices, and it did set out common requirements for authenticity of origin, the integrity of
content and the legibility of the invoice, but by leaving large areas of regulation up to the
Member States it also seemed to sanction dis-harmony.
In the GCC the same cautionary approach with respect to mandating digital invoices
prevails. There are community guidelines indicating the elements that appear on an invoice,27
but there is no community mandate that the invoice must be digital. Paper is fully acceptable.
Then again, the GCC’s Framework Agreement specifies the establishment of an
Electronic Service System by the Secretariat General that is tasked with exchanging detailed,
invoice-level transaction data among the Member States. This function implies (but does not
require) data collection from a prior digital source – the invoice.28 It’s fair to say that digital
invoices are anticipated, but are just not mandated (yet).
At the Member State level – there is UK and KSA evidence that universal digital invoices
are coming. The UK and KSA both mandate that one kind of invoice must be digital – B2G
invoices. In one case (the UK) the B2G digital invoice mandate arrived from the “top-down” – a
community mandate; in the other case (the KSA) the B2G digital invoice mandate developed
from the “bottom-up” – as an invoice extension of a prior digital payment system.
The UK mandate is a direct result of community law. EU Directive 2014/55 (on
electronic invoicing in public procurement of April 16, 2014), was required to be transposed into
national law “not later than November 18, 2018.” The Directive sets out a comprehensive
package of policy and practical measures requiring all public administrations in EU Member
States to be able to receive e-invoices for public procurements. While not expressly mandating
that only digital invoices can be used B2G, the Directive does “everything but.”29 Paper invoices
remain theoretically possible, but for all practical purposes they are eliminated, given the
business efficiency (and government expectation) of going digital.30
Things developed differently in the KSA. In 2004, twelve years before the VAT was
adopted (on January 1, 2018), the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) launched the
SADAD31 Payment System. It served initially as the national Electronic Bill Presentment and
GCC Framework Agreement, Art. 55 (tax invoices); Art. 56 (contents of the invoice); Art. 59 (invoice retention
period)
28 GCC Framework Agreement, Art.71 (including TIN for both buyer and seller, number and date of the invoice,
description of the supply, consideration paid.)
29 EU Directive 2014/55 was the result of years of effort. Several Member States began experimenting with
mandatory B2G digital invoices (Spain, Italy and Slovenia) in the early 2000’s, which led in 2008 to the PanEuropean Public Procurement Online (PEPPOL) project. PEPPOL actively promoted B2G standardization.
PEPPOL defines its mission as developing and implementing the technology standards to align business processes
for electronic procurement across all governments within Europe, aiming to expand market connectivity and
interoperability between eProcurement communities. See: http://wiki.eclass.eu/wiki/PEPPOL.
30 Aleksandra Bal indicates studies conducted a decade ago observe at that time that, “... companies that fully
transitioned to automated purchasing and payment systems could, on average, process electronic invoices seven
times faster and for one-tenth the cost of traditional invoices.” VAT Trends in Europe: Digitalization and Real-Time
Filing, 93 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 717 (February 18, 2019).
31 SADAD is Arabic for “to pay.” See: https://www.sadad.com/en/Pages/VMO.html
27
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Payment (EBPP) service for the Kingdom. The SADAD carried out a digital payment mandate
for G2B in the Kingdom. Over the next decade SADAD has grown beyond government
transactions, and beyond payments. It now facilitates and streamlines a wide range of
transactions for individuals, businesses and banks.
Five months after the VAT was introduced SAMA announced the launch of Esal. This is
an e-invoice business payment platform. Esal not only processes all invoices for government
entities, it does the same for other businesses. B2G invoices are required to be digital, and are
required to be processed through Esal. But, B2B and B2C invoices (without a mandate) can now
be found side-by-side with B2G invoices within Esal.
Esal’s open structure coupled with a small fee for usage makes it an inviting digital
intermediary for all transactions in the Kingdom. As Ziad Al Yousef, Managing Director of
Payment Systems at SAMA indicated:
we developed Esal because [we] wanted to ensure that businesses and governments
also had a secure solution to electronically transfer invoices and collect payments
in a swift and transparent way. Further, by facilitating interactions between
suppliers and buyers, our service will enable immense improvements in customer
experience, financial management and collections and bring about substantive
benefits to the broader Saudi economy. 32
Thus, in invoicing and in payments, Saudi businesses can (but are not required to) “go
digital” at limited cost (unless of course, they are contracting with the government where they
must be digital). If the KSA wanted to turbo-charge the voluntary adoption of digital invoices in
the Kingdom, it would make Esal a free service for Saudi businesses.
The road to universal digital invoices – in the KSA and UK. There are many roads to
comprehensive digital invoicing. Thus, it is not surprising that “before we get there” we will see
inconsistent adoption.
Even among the countries that directly mandate digital invoices, the rules are not fully
universal (within or among countries). The following eleven countries are generally considered
to have a universal mandate for digital invoices – Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Fiji, Rwanda, South Korea, Mexico, Ukraine, and Uruguay. But if we dig deeper we
find that Fiji’s mandate is truly comprehensive, including all businesses regardless of size or
legal form. But if we contrast South Korea we find that their mandate includes all corporations
regardless of size, but for non-corporate entities with supplies less that 300 million KRW in the
previous year (roughly $250,000 USD) an exception allows paper invoices.
KSA’s Encouragement of Digital Invoices
KSA’s Esal seeks to produce the equivalent of a universal mandate though economic
persuasion. Esal is a low-cost, state of the art invoicing and payment platform open to all Saudi

Press Release, SAMA Rolls Out “Esal” Digital Invoicing System to Support Saudi Government Entities and
Businesses, (March 14, 2018) available at: http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/News/Pages/news14052018.aspx
32
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businesses. Figure 1 (below) replicates the diagram, “How Esal works” from the SAMA web
site page.33
Figure 1: Digital Invoices and Payments through Esal in KSA
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In Figure 1 a Seller seeking to provide supplies to a Buyer uploads the data of a pro
forma agreement to Esal [1]. Esal takes this data, as presented. Almost any commercial form or
data structure is acceptable, and Esal converts what it receives into a standard Esal invoice. The
Buyer then exports this data [2]. Together the Seller [3a] and the Buyer [3b] have the
opportunity to “View and take Action” on the pro forma invoice that remains stored in Esal
(actions would include canceling or deleting the invoice, changing terms, or viewing comments
and supporting documents).
When Buyer and Seller agree that the data in Esal reflects their bargain, the seller may
begin performance according to the contract and the Buyer may tell his bank to pay the invoice
according to contract [4]. The invoice is made available to the bank by Esal [5]. Funds are
transferred according to the agreement directly from the Buyer’s Bank to the Seller’s Bank [6].
There is real-time notification of payment [7a] made back to Esal with onward payment
notification provided by Esal to the Seller [7b]. Esal includes this transaction in a Settlement
Report for the Seller [7c].
Under this scheme, Esal produces a unitary standardized invoice, provides the invoice to
the Buyer and Seller, preserves a record of the transaction, and facilitates payment. The missing
element in Figure 1 is the VAT. But that is understandable. Esal was not developed for tax
purposes; it was developed to help modernize and improve the efficiency of Saudi businesses. 34
33
34

See: https://esal.sa/faq
Esal lists the following benefits for Buyers:
1. Reduce costs;
2. Increase compliance and transparency through integration with ERP/Accounting systems;
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A mere six months after the adoption of the KSA VAT, on July 2, 2018, the tax element
in Esal was folded into the platform through a Memorandum of Understanding between the
General authority for Zakat and Tax (GAZT) and Esal. Four major goals/benefits are expected
from the MOU:
(1) ... encourage[ing] companies and government entities to implement e-invoicing through
the e-platform; ...
(2) ... allow[ing] government agencies and companies to greatly reduce the time, effort and
money invested in complying with GAZT’s regulatory requirements, ...
(3) ... the partnership ... will also enable GAZT to get detailed information about the
invoicing transactions in Saudi Arabia through the e-platform; ... [and]
(4) Esal ... will allow GAZT to monitor e-invoices issued by VAT-registered businesses to
ensure collection of the VAT amounts due and reduce tax evasion cases ...35
As a result, Figure 1 needs to be modified to include the new connections between Esal
and GAZT that have developed (and could be further developed) as a consequence of the MOU.
It needs to be clearly noted that, these are tax developments arising well after the commercial
commitment has been made by SAMA to encourage digital invoicing in the Kingdom, and well
before initiating Esal. GAZT’s integration efforts are just one manifestation how digital
invoicing will benefit the Kingdom. Figure 2 (below), is based on Figure 1, and illustrates the
Esal-GAZT relationship.
Figure 1 also needs to incorporate the electronic service system that each Member State is
required to establish under the GCC Agreement, Article 71(1). We assume that the KSA’s
electronic services system will be part of the GAZT, thus digital invoices produced through Esal
are passed in real-time into the Saudi electronic services system, and then passed further to the
GCC’s Secretary General’s Cloud-based Tax Information Center (also under the mandate of
Article 71(1)).
As a result, Figure 2 (below) illustrates the GCC’s Tax Information Center, with further
indications that digital invoices from KSA are replicated there. It anticipates inclusion of
invoices from each of the other GCC jurisdictions (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the UAE).

3. Improve Financial Management through automated invoice-to-payment reconciliation;
4. Increase accessibility by enabling access to invoice information through public internet.
Esal lists the following benefits for Sellers:
1. Electronic invoicing and delivery provides new options to deliver invoices to buyers;
2. Improves customer experience due to transparent processes and accessibility;
3. Faster invoice collection due to a high response speed from SADAD Bills for electronic payments;
4. Improved Financial Management through automated invoice-to-payment reconciliation.
35 GAZT Press release, MoU between GAZT and “ESAL” to facilitate e-invoicing in KSA (July 2, 2018) available
at: https://www.vat.gov.sa/en/news-media/press-releases/mou-between-gazt-and-%E2%80%9Cesal%E2%80%9Dto-facilitate-e-invoicing-in-ksa

8
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574381

Figure 2: Esal Invoices & Payments with GAZT‘s Electronic Service System, GCC’s Tax Information Center & (hypothetical) fiscalization
GCC Secretary General’s Cloud-based
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Esal’s relations with GAZT make it entirely possible that a buyer could arrange, or be
required to pay VAT directly to GAZT [9], and not remit it to the Seller (or the Seller’s Bank) as
part of the funds transfer at [6]. Then again, even without a mandate, a buyer could instruct its
bank [8] to make split-payments, and notify the Seller of the deposit, if GAZT regulations would
allow this.
What is perhaps even more significant is that the long-term intention for the GAZT-Esal
partnership seems to be that it will help fulfil the requirements of Article 71(1) of the GCC VAT
Agreement which states that:
Each Member State shall create an Electronic Services System for the purposes of
complying with requirements related to Tax. The GCC Secretary General shall take
the necessary measures to establish a Tax Information Center, operate a central
website or electronic system to follow up the information related to Internal
Supplies and exchange this information with the concerned Tax authorities in the
Member States; provided the website or electronic system of the tax information
center must include the following information at least:
a. The TIN for the Supplier and the Customer;
b. Number and date of the Tax Invoice;
c. Description of the transaction;
d. Consideration of the transaction.36
This appears to be the major reason that Esal will make available to GAZT “...detailed
information about invoicing transactions ... [which] will allow GAZT to monitor e-invoices
GCC VAT Agreement, Art. 71(1). Translations from the Arabic are sometime rendered in awkward English, but
the intent has been to retain the legal substance without necessarily providing the most prosaic English.
36
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issued by VAT-registered businesses to ensure collection of the VAT amounts due and reduce
tax evasion ...” The collected tax-relevant-data will undoubtedly be sent to the Saudi Electronic
Services System, and then relayed to the yet-to-be-established GCC Tax Information Center,
which in turn will share it with other GCC Member States. Cross-border sharing of tax
information among the Member States of a community is critical to preventing Missing Trader
Intra-Community (MTIC) frauds. The plan appears to be to have this exchange occurring
digitally, in real-time, among the GCC Member States, and through the GCC Tax Information
Center.
We had speculated about the design of this tax information sharing system in two
previous papers. In an October 17, 2016 paper (before the GCC Agreement was public) we
considered three traditional EU solutions to cross-border VAT fraud prevention, as well as the
technology-intensive solution applied in Rwanda (DICE).37 After the text of the Framework
Agreement became public (April 21, 2017), we revisited each of the EU solutions previously
considered, and factored in the use of the technology suggested in the GCC Framework
Agreement. Based on current technology developments we speculated that the GCC might be
moving in the direction of India’s invoice matching regime, and would further adopt a
blockchain to share data.38 Events have shown that following India would have been an error,39
but nothing has happened to discourage the adoption of blockchain data storage and information
exchange.
Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, GCC VAT: The Intra-Gulf Trade Problem, 84 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 315 (October 17, 2016) (considering a pure customs based system to cross-border frauds at 318319; an accounting based system of reverse charges at 319-321; a one-stop-shop implementation which took special
note that all Member States would impose VAT at a uniform 5% rate, although with variances in the tax base at 321324, and finally a technology-based solution modeled on the Rwanda VAT employing the Digital Invoice Customs
Exchange (DICE) which uses digital invoices to better achieve a customs, accounting, or on-stop-shop solution at
324-31).
38 Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT: GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695 (May 22, 2017).
39 Indivjal Dhasmana, Two Years After Roll-out, GST glitches still exist says CAG Report, BUSINESS STANDARD
(July 31, 2019), available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/2-years-after-roll-out-gstglitches-still-exist-says-cag-report-119073001707_1.html
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) has pointed out lacunae in the GST
regime, saying that system-validated input tax credit through invoice matching is not in place and a
non-intrusive e-tax system still remains elusive after two years of its roll out.
In its report on GST for 2017-18 tabled in Parliament on Tuesday, the CAC said tax
collections under the GST slowed down in the first year of its roll out.
To buttress its point, the CAG said growth in indirect taxes of the Union government slowed
down to 5.80 per cent in 2017-18 as compared to 21.33 per cent during 2016-17.
It said the complexity of the returns mechanism and the technical glitches resulted in roll
back of invoice-matching, rendering the system prone to input tax credit frauds. Without invoice
matching and auto generation of refunds, the envisaged GST tax compliance system is non-functional,
it said. ... While it was expected compliance would improve as the system would stabilize, all returns
being filed showed a declining trend from April 2018 to December 2018, it said
See: Union Government, Department of Revenue, REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
for the year ended March 2018 (Indirect Taxes – Goods and Services Tax) Report No. 11 of 2019, available at:
https://www.cag.gov.in/content/report-no11-2019-compliance-audit-union-government-department-revenueindirect-taxes-%E2%80%93-goods. For a diagram and discussion of the Indian invoice matching regime and its
GCC blockchain application see: Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi, Mike Cheetham, and Camille Tirand, A
VATCoin Solution to MTIC Fraud: Past Efforts, Present Technology, and the EU’s 2017 Proposal, 89 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 335, 355-359 (January 22,2018).
37
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As we suspected, it seems clear that the KSA’s (or perhaps the larger GCC’s) approach to
invoice management will be deeply technological. It is not invoice matching. KSA’s approach
is rooted in direct oversight of invoice creation, not invoice “matching” of buyer and seller
documentation. Through Esal, KSA is directly engaged in producing the invoice that will be
used by both buyer and the seller. GAZT will be have access to and will monitor this process. If
there is a drawback to the KSA approach it will be measured in participation levels. Esal is a
low-cost, state of the art invoice and payment system that (presently) is mandatory only for B2G
transactions. B2B and B2C use of Esal is voluntary.
The question that needs to be asked is: Will the GAZT-Esal partnership discourage
participation? If so, might this trigger a response whereby the government would mandate Esalcreated digital invoices for all Saudi businesses, or perhaps in the interim make Esal free?
Figure 3 (below) is reproduced from our earlier paper. Is shows how we envisioned
invoice data would be secured under Article 71. It adopts the Indian invoice-matching
mechanism. It would adopt AI-based risk analysis. It would facilitate exchange of tax
information through blockchain.
We still believe the use of blockchain is the favored digital invoice storage device. The
major change in our analysis is the front-end mechanism for gathering the tax data for the
blockchain. It is likely that an Esal-based fiscal invoice will function much like the fiscal
invoices in Fiji, Samoa, and Rwanda.40 This projection of developments is reinforced not only
by the establishment of the GAZT-Esal partnership on July 2, 2018, but by the August 31, 2019
creation of a National Center for Artificial Intelligence, and a National Data Management Office
in the KSA.
Figure 3 illustrates what we believed was under consideration in the GCC in 2017.
Today, it is clear that a different road has been taken. Rather than collecting comprehensive
invoice data through matching invoice data held by buyers with comparable data held by sellers,
we expect the GCC to follow invoice fiscalization. The cross-border exchange of tax
information through blockchain remains highly desirable. We anticipate that blockchain
technology will allow adoption of comprehensive AI risk assessment measures. The blockchain
diagrams that followed Figure 3 (Figure 5 in the previous article) remain applicable, even though
the Indian invoice matching mechanism does not seem appropriate any more.
Note, this is a cross-border (intra-community) application of Indian invoice-matching, not
a purely domestic fact application. Business “A” is in KSA and business “B” is in the UAE.
Data sharing is a function of the GCC Agreement.

Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT: GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695 (May 22, 2017).
40
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Figure 3: Application of Indian “invoice matching” to Article 71
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Reprinted from: Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT:
GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695 (May 22, 2017), Figure 5 at 711.

Faced with a similar cross border fact pattern, where Esal is utilized to compose a
common invoice, Figure 3 (above) changes to something more like Figure 4 (below). This is
premised on company “B” having a valid Commercial Registration in KSA.41
In Figure 4 both the Saudi business and the UAE business are registered. The Esal
mechanism is shared. The solid-black and black-outlined arrows represent transaction data
transferred from Esal to the Secure Element (SE) 42 first (in solid black) for the transfer to the
KSA’s GAZT and then secondly (in black-outlined arrows) for the transfer to the UAE’s FTA
(Federal Tax Authority). Black-outline is used for UAE transactions because it is not entirely
clear if the KSA is willing to share Esal with non-Saudi entities, or if the foreign tax authorities
are willing or able to participate. Each transfer is essentially a request for fiscalization which
will be performed by the SE within each tax authority. The fiscalized invoice is then (a)

One of the Frequently Asked Questions on the Esal web site explains (https://esal.sa/faq):
Can I register on Esal if my company is not in KSA?
Your company must have a valid Commercial Registration (CR) number or a Municipality license
number, and be registered in KSA to make use of the Esal platform.
42 The secure element is “… the software and hardware used by an electronic fiscal device (EFD) and the [Tax]
Authority to prevent tampering and unauthorized use of fiscal data transmitted to the Authority’s system and to
maintain the integrity of the fiscal data … GOVERNMENT OF FIJI GAZETTE Vol. 18, No. 62 (July 3, 2017) publishing
regulation 28 of the TAX ADMINISTRATION (ELECTRONIC FISCAL DEVICE) REGULATIONS 2017, at §2(1), page 76.
41
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retained by the KSA and UAE electronic service system, (b) transferred the GCC’s Tax
Information Center, and (c) returned to the buyer and the seller for proof of fiscalization.
Fiscalization has a local and systemic aspect. The fiscalization process will confirm both
(a) the authenticity of the document, the accuracy of the data and calculations on the face of the
invoice, as well as the identity of the underlying buyer or seller, and (b) supply meta-data that
will aggregate attributes and apply an appropriate sequencing convention to the invoices from
each jurisdiction. The SE will design a QR code to be placed on the invoice that will allow
immediate verification of the invoice by any auditor or the customer with a scanner, as well as
confirm the sequencing of invoices.
The fiscalized invoice will be returned to the buyer or seller as well as remitted through
the KSA’s and UAE’s electronic service system into the GCC Secretary General’s Cloud-based
Tax Information Center. Both Saudi and UAE authorities can (and should) apply AI risk
analysis programs to the shared data base.
Figure 4: Application of KSA’s Esal mechanism (shared) to Article 71 with (hypothetical) Invoice Fiscalization
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UK’s Making Tax Digital (Without Digital Invoices)
In 2015 the UK announced the Making Tax Digital (MTD) program. After a
considerable amount of planning, the first stage went into effect on April 1, 2019. MTD will be
applied to VAT returns that have taxable periods beginning between April 1 and March 31.
Corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income tax (PIT) will come later.
The essence of MTD-VAT is that VAT-registered businesses above the threshold
(currently £85,000) will be required to (a) keep records digitally and (b) file returns using MTD
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compatible software. There is no requirement to issue or receive digital invoices. The UK effort
can be seen as a back-end digitization mandate, as opposed to a front-end digitization effort, like
that in the KSE. The KSE is starting with digital invoices and will move upstream to digital
returns. The UK is starting upstream with the digital returns and their preparation, and appears
to have an expectation that efficiency will push digitization downstream to the invoice.
Functional compatible software. Unlike KSA which has designed a single invoice
software application for all taxpayers, the MTD accepts any commercially available software
(provided the software meets compliance needs). Both the KSA’s Esal and the MTD make every
effort to accommodate taxpayers. Esal, aside from B2G transactions, is low-cost and voluntary
(invoice-by-invoice). Hopefully, businesses will join. The MTD is mandatory, requiring use of
any “functional compatible software,” but the software is not a “one-size-fits-all” governmentprovided product. There is considerable freedom of choice among commercially available
software, but it must be “certified” compliant by the HMRC. Hopefully, businesses will
integrate this software with a digital invoice program (but that is not required).
“Functional compatible software” is a software program, or set of software programs,
products or applications, that is able to:
1. record and preserve digital records;
2. provide information and tax returns from data held in those digital records by using
HMRC’s API platform; and
3. receive information from HMRC using the API platform.43
Multiple software products acceptable. “HMRC expects ... [some] software ... will
perform all of these [compatibility] functions ... [and] some software programs will not ... The
complete set of digital records to meet Making Tax Digital requirements does not all have to be
held in one place or in one program. Digital records can be kept in a range of compatible digital
formats. Taken together, these form the digital records for the VAT registered entity.”44
Digital links required. Importantly, once required records have been secured and
rendered digital, they must remain digital. All data transfers from this point forward must be
through “digital links.” Mandatory digital links are the heart of MTD.
Data transfer or exchange within and between software programs,
applications or products that make up functional compatible software must be
digital where the information continues to form part of the digital records. Once
data has been entered into software used to keep and maintain digital records, any
further transfer, recapture or modification of that data must be done using digital
links. Each piece of software must be digitally linked to other pieces of software
to create the digital journey. ... transferring data manually ... is not acceptable under
Making Tax Digital.

VAT NOTICE 700/22: Making Tax Digital for VAT, at 4.2, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vat-notice-70022-making-tax-digital-for-vat
44 VAT NOTICE 700/22, at 4.2.
43
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A ‘digital link’ is one where a transfer or exchange of data is made ...
without ... manual intervention such as the copying over of information by hand or
manual transposition ... A digital link includes
- linked cells in spreadsheets, ...
- emailing a spreadsheet containing digital records so the information can
be imported into another software product ...
- transferring a set of digital records onto a portable device ... and
physically giving this to someone else who then imports that data ...
but not ‘cut and paste’ or ‘copy and paste’ to select and move information...45
Required data does not include invoices. Certain data must be kept digitally, including
the business name, the address of the principal place of business, the VAT registration number,
any VAT accounting schemes used.46 The supplies made, and for each supply made, the time of
supply, the tax point, the value of the supply, and the net value excluding VAT rate of VAT
charged must be digital.47 Supplies received and for each supply received, the time of supply
(tax point), value of the supply, and amount of input tax to be claimed must be digital.48
For all practical purposes the data required to be kept digitally is the data on the invoice,
and yet MTD states clearly: “You will need to keep additional records, such as invoices. You do
not have to keep these digitally but you may choose to do so.”49 Thus, the MTD comes right to
the edge of the mandatory digital invoices, and then backs away. It is not clear why, but it may
have to do with public perception, or MTD reception. Professional perception of the MTD
clearly associates it with other cutting-edge digital invoice regimes, but this appears to be more
an anticipation of what will be rather than the current reality.50

VAT NOTICE 700/22, at 4.2.1.
VAT NOTICE 700/22, at 4.3.1
47 VAT NOTICE 700/22, at 4.3.2.
48 VAT NOTICE 700/22, at 4.3.3.
49 VAT NOTICE 700/22, at 4.3.
50 That the MTD program is “backing away from the digital edge” is very apparent when the secondary literature on
MTD is considered. Many commentators assume that the MTD is further along the digital road that it really is. For
example, consider James Bunney, MTD: Examples from around the World, ACCOUNTANCY DAILY (January 21,
2019) available at: https://www.accountancydaily.co/mtd-examples-around-world. Bunney provides seven
examples of other “MTD jurisdictions.” The difficulty is, each example involves everything the MTD does, but
they all take the next step and complete the reform by adopting real-time digital invoicing sent directly to the tax
authority. In addition, the “calling card” for each reform is the impact it has on serious VAT fraud, which is
difficult to triangulate into the UK fact pattern, precisely because it is an incomplete reform. The countries
considered by Bunney are: Mexico, which adopted electronic invoicing in September 2010; Czech Republic, which
adopted mandatory, online VAT returns via a state-provided data services system, but in 2015 digital invoices
(receipts) were required that were automatically submitted to the tax authority in real-time; China, in 2016 einvoicing became mandatory for significant service industries, which functions both as a receipt and a tax invoice
(technically issued by the Tax Bureau, but provided by the seller); Poland, as of 2016, and then 2018 digital
invoices (for large companies, and them medium sized companies) are submitted to the tax authority in XML format
through a government platform; Brazil, as of 2017 adopted the Nota Fiscal Electrõnica (NF-e) which is a mandatory
system of electronic invoicing which is submitted to the government in real-time; Spain, in 2017 introduced a
mandatory system of digital invoices in 2017 for large businesses (extended to all businesses in 2018) that must be
uploaded in an XML file to the government within four days of issuance (near-real-time); Italy has required prepopulated tax returns since 2015, but as of January 2019 electronic invoicing became mandatory for all businesses in
XML (digitally signed to guarantee authenticity) and uploaded to the tax authority through a dedicated portal.
45
46
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If, however, a UK enterprise uses digital invoicing, and if it links the digital invoice to
MTD’s functional compatible software, the UK has achieved exactly what KSA seeks to achieve
if it persuades all Saudi businesses to use Esal. Both the UK and the KSA appear to have chosen
indirect methods (front-ended in one case and back-ended in the other), through which they hope
to persuade commerce to become fully digital. In both cases the governments have avoided a
direct digital invoice mandate, but in both instances that is the direction they appear headed.
FISCALIZED DIGITAL INVOICES, COUNTERS, AND VATCoin
As presently constituted neither the KSA’s Esal system, nor the UK’s MTD system will
do much to reduce VAT frauds, without at the same time making a commitment to enhancing
traditional audit capabilities with technology professionals. Too much fraud is turbocharged
with tech today for detection with traditional, “gum shoe,” approaches to be effective. If a
jurisdiction is not going to secure transactional data with technology before the fraud, it is going
to need technology assistance to ferret out the fraud after the theft has occurred. Expensive
audit-technologists (digital forensic specialist, and data analysts) are needed in field audits when
dealing with technology frauds.
However, the stated promise of both the KSA and the UK programs are that they are
designed for fraud prevention.51 That is a promise that simply cannot be realized without a
fiscalized digital invoice. Fraud prevention and detection displays must be embedded in digital
invoices, and the data must be captured instantly (before any manipulation is possible).
Because businesses can always opt in and out of Esal transaction-by-transaction Esal
cannot be an impediment to fraud (outside of the B2G sector). The situation is much the same in
the UK where invoice-level data manipulation (Zappers and Phantomware) are unobstructed by
the MTD. The UK simply preserves manipulated records as they move upstream. The same is
true of the missing trader intra-community (MTIC) frauds. Without securing the true original
invoice data in the first instance and improving the information exchange among Member States
in the second, the UK’s MTD regime is nicely digital, but it unfortunately will not meet fraud
prevention needs.
Comprehensive fraud prevention will only be possible in the KSA and the UK, if and
when further steps are taken. These steps have been taken elsewhere with noteworthy results.
Mohammed Al-Haidian, Director of the Information Technology Department at GAZT indicated:
"SAMA’s “ESAL” platform will also allow GAZT to monitor e-invoices issued by VAT-registered
businesses to ensure collection of the VAT amounts due and reduce tax evasion cases,"
GAZT Press Release, MoU between GAZT and “ESAL” to facilitate e-invoicing in KSA (July 2, 2018) available at:
https://www.vat.gov.sa/en/news-media/press-releases/mou-between-gazt-and-%E2%80%9Cesal%E2%80%9D-tofacilitate-e-invoicing-in-ksa
UK Office of Tax Simplification, Technology Review: a vision for tax simplification, (January 2019) at ¶1.100
available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771123/OTS_Tec
hnology_paper_Jan_19.pdf
The push by the financial services sector for people to move towards cashless transactions (and
therefore away from cash) is a contentious issue. In theory, it should lead to more efficient processes
for business, with electronic transactions leaving an auditable trail allowing for more accurate
calculation of tax, and a reduction in fraudulent activity.
51
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A comprehensive mandate for fiscalized digital invoices is needed. Invoices need to
include active QR codes that allow immediate verification of transactions. It must confirm that
tax has been paid, collected, and remitted (with an acknowledgement of receipt by the
government). Not a passive QR code. Not a code that simply reproduces digitally what is
printed on the face of the invoice. In addition, counters need to be embedded in the invoice and
in the QR display. Finally, when a VATCoin is used in place of fiat currency to pay and collect
VAT, the QR Code needs to record the specific VATCoins used (particularly when transactions
are cross-border). The model is Fiji.
Fiscalized Digital Invoices
A fiscalized digital invoice has two elements: (a) to be valid, an invoice must be digital in
the first instance (paper invoices are fine, but only as a memorial of the prior and primary digital
invoice),52 and (b) each invoice must be validated by the tax authority (through the TaxCore) in
real-time. Validation will include a digital signature and an active QR code displayed on the
invoice. Fiscalization is a simple two-step process accommodated by secure software at the
business issuing the invoice. A request is made first, and companion software within the tax
authority issues the response. Fiscalization must be possible both online and offline.53
The Request – Figure 5. The request is a fully automated process. Immediately after the
POS, or other Accredited Invoice System (AIS) 54 has assembled the transaction data the
accredited POS/AIS system will make a direct internet-based request for fiscalization through an
associated Sales Data Controller (SDC) residing within the tax authority’s TaxCore.55 The
transaction data elements 56 will be combined with the POS/AIS’s Digital Certificate and PAC57
Penalties related to missing or incomplete digital invoices in Quebec are $100, or $300 to $5,000 depending on
severity, with $1,000 to $5,000 for a second offence within five years, and $5,000 to $50,000 for multiple offenses
within five years. Sanctions related specifically to the Sales Recording Module are a $300 penalty (per invoice) and
a $2,000 to $100,000 fine with a maximum of six months in prison with suspension or revocation of the registration
certificate. https://www.revenuquebec.ca/en/fair-for-all/ensuring-tax-compliance/penalties-andinterest/penalties/penalties-specific-situations/penalties-and-fines-in-the-restaurant-sector/. In Brazil commercial
law requires invoices to be digital to be enforced. Tax compliance follows commercial practice. See: Decree 6022
of 2007 established the Public System of Digital Accounting (Institui o Sistema Público de Escrituração Digital)
(SPED). In Fiji the penalties for violating the invoicing rules range from up to $10,000, or up to $25,000, or
$50,000 depending on the gross annual turnover of the business (less than $500,000, or less than $1,5000, or over
41,500,000). All figures are in Fiji dollars. Government of Fiji Gazette, Tax Administration Act 2009, Electronic
Fiscal Device Regulations 2017, Article 23, available at: https://www.frcs.org.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/LN37-Tax-Administration-Electronic-Fiscal-Device-Regulations-2017.pdf
53 There are some minor hardware differences between an online system (utilizing a virtual sales data recorder – VSDC) and an off-line system (utilizing an external sales data recorder – E-SDC). Cost is not factor. Most locations
in Fiji utilize both online and off-line. The technical differences are discussed in Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran
Todorov, Fiji: A Digital Invoice System Fights Fraud and Enforces Real-Time VAT Compliance, 92 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 697 (November 12, 2018).
54 An Accredited Invoice System (AIS) is an umbrella term covering devices and systems capable of producing
receipts (normally issued in B2C transactions) and invoices (normally issued in B2B transactions. A point-of-sale
(POS) system is one specific application on an AIS. POS and AIS will be used interchangeably in this text.
55 As indicated above, there are virtual and physical (external) SDCs. Figure 5 illustrates the V-SDC
56 In Fiji these elements are specified in EFD Reg. §20(2)(a) – (j).
57 PAC is the POS Access Code. It is comprised of 6 characters assigned by taxpayer at time the taxpayer obtains
the digital certificate, and it functions as a password to authenticate that “request” for fiscalization is authorized.
52

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574381

to be sent forward to the secure element (SE). The SE verifies the request, and identifies the
caller (the authorized taxpayer using the POSAIS/). The SDC has an accompanying Digital
Certificate which verifies its identity.
Figure 5 (below) provides a sketch of the request for a fiscal invoice.
Figure 5
Request for Fiscal Invoice [accredited POS/AIS]
Reprinted from: Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Fiji: A Digital Invoice System Fights Fraud and Enforces
Real-Time VAT Compliance, 92 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 697, 703, figure 1 (November 12, 2018).
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The Response – Figure 6. After confirming the validity of the request, the secure element
associates the transactional data (specified preciously) with additional elements as required.58 In
most instances these elements include a digital signature and the verification URL through which
the QR code can be generated by the POS/AIS. The result is the fiscal invoice. The customer (or
another party) can scan the QR code to confirm that the invoice data has been recorded in the
TaxCore.

58

In Fiji these elements are specified in EFD Reg. §20(2)(k) – (o).
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Figure 6
Response to request for Fiscal Invoice [accredited POS/AIS]
Reprinted from: Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Fiji: A Digital Invoice System Fights Fraud and Enforces
Real-Time VAT Compliance, 92 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 697, 703, figure 1 (November 12, 2018).
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Fiji’s fiscalized digital invoices not only allow customers to confirm that the VAT was
remitted, but they develop (within the TaxCore) a comprehensive data-base of all transactions
within the domestic ecosystem. Artificial intelligence (AI) engines are applied. Risk analysis
and audit selection is streamlined. Audits are not chosen blindly, or based on “hunches.” They
are data-driven. Counters embedded in the data streams fine-tune the remote assessment,
preserving data in a mini-blockchain for highly efficient domestic audits.
Without fiscalized digital invoices, neither the KSA’s Esal/GAZT partnership, nor the
UK’s MTD program can achieve these efficiencies. The KSA and UK data bases are either
incomplete (in the case of the KSA) or not demonstrably reliable (in the case of the UK).
However, there is a very real possibility that the KSA could complete its data base with a
digital invoice mandate, and lead the GCC into a community-wide adoption of what will be a
remarkably sophisticated VAT. The UK, in contrast, is nowhere near this level of achievement.
Counters and Mini-blockchains
Fiji’s fiscalized digital invoices do more than confirm the accuracy of a particular
receipt/invoice, and construct a centralized data-base of transactions within the Tax Core. They
also build a POS/AIS-specific blockchain of transactions. As with all blockchains, the data is
permanent and immutable. It is impossible to obscure a transaction once it has been input and
fiscalized. Each customer will be an extension of a government audit team when they scan a QR
code. The scan will report and confirm a specific transaction, and also validate the miniblockchain within which this transaction resides.
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Because neither the KSA (through the Esal/GAZT partnership), nor the UK (through the
MTD program) currently fiscalize tax-invoices, neither can apply data counters to key invoice
attributes, and neither can preserve invoice data in a mini-blockchain. An automated proof of
audit is impossible. These opportunities are further along the technology path for both
jurisdictions, although the KSA may be much closer than the UK to these achievements. At least
partial fiscalization is possible in the KSA, if a TaxCore and secure element is placed within a
Member State’s electronic services system to fiscalize some of the transactions. The problem
with a partial approach in the KSA is incomplete invoice data. Not all invoices go through Esal.
As a consequence, a blockchain will have limited value, and the embedded counters will be
useless.
There are real, substantive reasons why Fiji’s solution is considered a “cutting-edge,”
technologically advanced, solution – the mini-blockchains, the counters, and the proof of audit
functionality. These operations are distinct, but they are inter-related.
Mini-blockchain. Fiji’s mini-blockchain is preserved (a) in the memory of the secure
element assigned to the POS/AIS that is producing the invoices in the chain, (b) in the Tax Core
of the Member State, and it is also (c) embedded (encrypted) in the QR code of each
receipt/invoice held by every customer. As with all blockchains, the data in the mini-blockchain
is permanent and immutable. Fiscalization secures the transaction data, counters bind the
transactions in a chain. The elements of each transaction are saved in multiple locations. It is
impossible to obscure the invoices once they have been fiscalized. Each customer becomes an
extension of a government auditor when the QR code is scanned to verify its contents.59 By
doing so, the customer reports and confirms not only his/her specific transaction, but the miniblockchain within which the transaction is preserved.
Counters. In the Fiji solution counters record the tax attributes of each receipt as those
attributes are sequentially placed on receipts. This record is embedded in the QR code of all
valid receipts. The counting function is non-discretionary. Counters cannot be turned off. Their
caps (or limits) can however, be re-specified by the tax authority. The cap on each counter is
initially pre-configured (pre-set) by the tax authority, and can only be re-set by official action.
Proof of audit. Counters in the Fiji solution have customized caps (limits). For example,
a counter for Normal Sales [NS] will add the amount for each normal sale sequentially as
invoices are produced. If the Secure Element (SE) observes that a particular counter, NS in this
instance, is getting close to its cap the SE will notify the operator that the POS/AIS will be shut
down, if it does not receive a proof of audit notification from the TaxCore. A successful proof of

Sales transaction can be reported to the tax authority either by the seller or the buyer. Although the norm is that
the seller reports sales, collects and remits VAT, in cases of missing receipts the buyer may be the best source for
information on a transaction. He can declare the purchase and report his payment of the tax to the seller (and the tax
authority) by scanning the QR code to verify the transaction. In an international cross-border context, buyers
scanning mandated QR codes on receipts has an additional value (not considered in this paper). Cross-border/
scanning can help detect fraudulent sales, and assist the tax authority to identify remote sellers who may be
collecting VAT, not filing returns, and then disappearing. See: Richard T. Ainsworth & Chang Che, Data First, Tax
Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s NetFlix Tax (Electronic Marketplaces) (Part 3) TAX
NOTES INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming).
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20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574381

audit will automatically reset all counters to zero (allowing the certified POS/AIS to continue
operating normally).
The proof of audit notification is a digital indication that all data from the POS/AIS and
the associated Secure Element (SE) have been recorded in the TaxCore; those data-bases match;
nothing is missing; and all counters are working properly. In other words, the proof of audit
means the mini-blockchain within the POS/AIS is complete and intact. There have been no
manipulations, omissions, or removals of data.
The proof of audit process is seamless, fully automated, and (depending on the scope of
the business under audit) a nearly continuous process. Most of the time, a proof of audit is
completely invisible to the taxpayer. Proof of audit provides assurance that everything is
accurately recorded. All a taxpayer really needs to do (to know that he is fully tax-compliant) is
to make sure that he has a stable connection to the internet.
Counters are the key (example)
KSA could adopt a system of counters today, if its transactional data base was complete.
It could initiate a pilot project if there was a limited rule requiring any business that used Esal for
one invoice to continue to use Esal for all its invoices.60 There is however, no such rule, and it is
perfectly acceptable for a Saudi business to weave in and out of Esal invoice-by-invoice.
An example is helpful. Counters isolate tax attributes on signed receipts. They are
subdivided by type of receipt: counters for Normal Sales [NS], Normal Refund [NR], Copy Sales
[CS], Copy Refund [CR], Training Sales [TS], Training Refund [TR] and Proforma Sales [PS]
are the most common. Additional counters reside with the SE. They record line items
cumulatively: cumulative turnover, tax totals, refund totals, per tax refund totals, and others.
Figure 7 (below) illustrates a single POS fiscalizing six receipts in sequence. The
diagram suggests that there could be ten or more POS systems engaged in this system (most
likely thousands), but only one is represented.61 Three types of receipts are illustrated:
• Normal Sales [NS],
• Normal Refund [NR], and
• Pro forma Sales [PS].
Associated with these receipts, there are twelve tax attributes that are “counted”
throughout the six-receipt sequence. Six “counters” relate to specific attributes of the receipt
considered, and the VAT associated with that attribute (listed as: NS; NR; PS; VAT on NS; VAT
For example, the KSA mandates digital invoices for B2G. It could easily mandate that if a business has both
government and non-government sales, then all of its sales must be run through Esal. If so, a series of small pilot
projects could be constructed around these hybrid suppliers, and a mini-blockchain could be constructed in these
companies for all their sales: B2G; B2B; and B3C.
61 The simplicity of the diagram in Figure 7 should not be underestimated. If POS-1 was Amazon these six
transactions would occur in less that a hundredth of a second. Jay Yarow, Amazon was Selling 306 Items Every
Second At Its Peak This Year, BUSINESS INSIDER (December 27, 2012) available at:
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-holiday-facts-2012-12 (this amount is 26.5 million transactions per day,
and comparable statistics have never been released again by Amazon).
60
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on NR; VAT on PS). Six additional counters aggregate these amounts across categories
throughout the six-receipt sequence.
Figure 7 shows POS-1 making six requests for fiscalization, and the SE in the SDC
within the TaxCore responding six times, signing each response after verifying the sender and
the data. The signature is noted as [Rcpt. Sig.] at the bottom of each receipt.
Figure 7 assumes that these are the first six transactions in a business cycle. The first
three transactions are normal sales [NS], followed by a normal return [NR], and then a pro forma
sale [PS], before returning to make another normal sale [NS] at invoice number six.
A QR code appearing on each receipt can be scanned by the purchaser (or any tax
official). The purchaser will see in an unequivocal format the complete data set of all
information on the invoice. A scan by the Tax Authority would disclose more. Some QR data is
encrypted. An auditor would be able to see not only the basic invoice, but also the separate and
aggregate tax-values captured by the counters. Thus, assuming a 10% VAT, a scan of the first
two receipts shows normal sales of 10, and VAT collected of 1.
The second receipt shows aggregate tax-values in addition to normal sales of 20, and
VAT from normal sales of 2. The aggregate counters on the second receipt show total normal
sales of 30 (10 + 20), and total VAT collected on normal sales of 3 (1 + 2). These results would
be visible to any auditor scanning the QR code on the second receipt.
Figure 7
Mini-blockchain -- Fiscal Counters supporting the Proof of Audit structure
Reprinted and modified from: Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Fiji: A Digital Invoice System Fights Fraud and Enforces
Real-Time VAT Compliance, 92 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 697, 711, figure 7 (November 12, 2018).
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Counters show the immediate transaction value (the amount of the NS, or the amount of
the NR), but they also reach back to the prior invoice (in the aggregating counters – Ttl. NS
increasing from 10 to 30 as we move from invoice [1] to invoice [2]) and connect these two
invoices in a chain. The system will wait (for a millisecond or two) to be further bound to the
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next invoice. The counters also function as trip-switches set by the Tax Administration to alert
the authority when something unexpected is happening that may need attention.
Assume that certified POS-1 is located at a small hamburger shop, where normal sales
are in the $10 to $15 range, occasionally a $50 sale is made, but rarely is a sale made for $100.
However, on special occasions (holidays, public gatherings in the neighborhood) the amounts
charged on a single ticket jump-up considerably. There are two kinds of exceptionally large
sales made by the hamburger shop: (a) a bulk sale to corporation in the area that provides free
meals for employees asked to work longer hours on occasion, and (b) street sales by roller
skating waiters and waitresses.
This hamburger shop is popular because of the way its waiters and waitresses sell and
deliver meals. The skaters tend to aggregate sales (on the fly) and record all sales as one batch in
the certified POS. When a large sale shows up in the shop’s POS it is invariably the result of
either a corporate bulk purchase or a skater’s aggregation of sales for an entire evening shift.
On high traffic days in the summer it is common to find one or more skaters entering
their sales late in the day having sold burgers, collected funds, and made change for individual
purchases with cash-on-hand. The tax authority has long suspected that the owner suppresses
sales with a Zapper or Phantomware. The preferred target for manipulation is believed to be one
or more of the largest sales tickets.
Figure 8 (below) replicates the facts of Figure 7 (above). In figure 8 receipt number 3 is
missing. This was the exceptionally high sale of 1,350.
The first thing the counters do is they show how to derive the missing sales amount
(1,350) and missing VAT amount (135). The sixth receipt confirms that the missing receipt must
be a NS. The sixth receipt is marked as the 4th NS receipt and the 6th receipt overall [TR:4/6
NS]. The receipt issued immediately prior to the missing receipt is [TR: 2/2 NS]. There is no
other NS receipt in the chain, so the missing receipt must be the third NS.
We can calculate the tax attributes of the missing NS receipt. We know they are 1,350 in
NS and 135 in VAT, because the NS immediately prior to the missing receipt reported total NS
of 30, and the receipt immediately after it reports total NS of 1,380 with total VAT from NS of 3
and 138 respectively. It does not matter that the receipt coming after the missing receipt was not
a NS. Aggregating counters preserve sales data continuously.
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Figure 8
Mini-blockchain & Fiscal Counters enforcing compliance with the Proof of Audit structure
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What makes the counters so effective is that they are built into the receipts in a manner
that builds a mini-blockchain. Each link (receipt) preserves the data embedded in the receipts
before and after. The entire chain is lodged in the Tax Core, replicated in the secure element of
the taxpayer’s certified POS, confirmed by every consumer or taxpayer who scans a receipt to
verify its authenticity (by “pinging” the Tax Core), and by any auditor (or AI program) that
assembles the data embedded in the invoices and re-calculates each receipt.
Neither the KSA’s Esal, nor the UK’s MTD can perform the oversight function of the Fiji
counters. Neither can blockchain transactions in real-time, and use the data in a sequence of
sales to derive missing or corrupted data elsewhere in the system. To reach the sophistication of
Fiji’s system both would need to mandate digital invoices, fiscalize them, and add counters to the
data flows with a QR code that preserves the data and allows immediate verification.
There are two long-standing audit problems with missing receipts. First, if an auditor
identifies that receipts are missing from an audit file, it is almost impossible to determine how
much was skimmed. As a result, the audit turns into an uncomfortable game of estimates and
guesswork.
For example, in the hamburger shop setting described above, where sales are normally
made in the $10 to $15 range. How would a traditional auditor determine that the amount
suppressed was actually $1,350 in gross sales, $135 in VAT, and not $15 for one burger and fries
with VAT of $1.50? The counters solve this problem directly.
The second problem is just as difficult to resolve. How does an auditor know that there is
a missing receipt in the first place, and how quickly can the auditor find this out? The traditional
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approach is to suspect fraud, then send undercover consumers into the restaurant who (over a
number of days) purchase meals for cash, and save the receipts. The auditor then begins a search
in the taxpayer’s records to see if any receipts have been removed. Aside from being time
consuming, this method is inherently hit or miss.
This is where the Fiji system turns again to the counters. The context is the automated
proof of audit. SDC’s are programmed to continuously assemble “audit packages,” essentially a
complete receipt (or a collection of several complete receipts). The data of “audit package’ is the
full journal record. In other words, it is all the meta data related to a specific transaction.
SDC’s are programmed to upload audit packages to the TaxCore on a regular and
continuous basis. The upload is authenticated with the Secure Element (SE). If the TaxCore
allows a successful upload, the SDC then requests a proof of audit.
Proof of Audit
The proof of audit function takes new data and moves backwards (link-by-link) through
the mini-blockchain, confirming that all of the data (including the data from the new audit
package) is contained in the POS and in the associated Secure Element (SE) have been
accurately recorded in the TaxCore. Nothing is missing, nothing is manipulated, and all the
counters are working properly.
In the example above, when an audit package is assembled and submitted for the fourth
receipt [TR: 1/4 NR], the proof of audit should fail. It will fail because the third receipt is
missing. Similarly, the proof of audit requested after the fifth [TR: 1/5 PS] and sixth [TR: 4/6
NS] receipts should also fail. They will fail for the same reason. Receipt three is missing.
The SDC will continue to upload receipts. It will continue to request a proof of audit,
and the proof of audit will continue to fail. The TaxCore will notify the DOR that something is
amiss at the hamburger shop, and an auditor should be assigned to visit the business. Similar
notices are regularly being sent to the owner. Everyone is aware of the problem.
There is one more step.
Each counter has a pre-set cap. The tax authority determines each cap, per counter, and
per certified POS/AIS. If we assume that the cap set by the DOR on the NS counter at the
hamburger shop is $1,500, then after the sixth receipt we are $1,430. There is only $70 in “cap
room” left to work with. If receipts are issued in excess of $70, the system will shut down. The
POS/AIS will no longer issue fiscal receipts.
This is the place where monetary fines for issuing invalid receipts (receipts that are not
fiscalized), or no receipts at all become important.62
There are three solutions to a business reaching the cap limit. If the owner of the
hamburger shop can find the missing receipt, he should enter it in the system. A proof of audit
62

See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
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request will immediately be sent and returned successfully. All the counters will be re-set to
zero. A second option would be for the customer to scan the QR code on the receipt originally
issued by the hamburger shop. This would also register the sale in the accounting system, and
initiate a proof of audit request. The third solution is to undergo a DOR audit, pay the tax,
penalties and interest and secure a DOR re-set of the counters.
The Fiji system clearly answers the most difficult sales suppression questions. It alerts
tax authorities (and the taxpayer) early on that sales suppression has been detected, and it needs
to be resolved. It also allows precise calculations of the amount of the suppression so that any
eventual audit can be accurate, assuming no earlier resolution of the apparent suppression is
found.
VATCoin
There have always been two sides to every VAT problem – the supply side, and the VAT
side. To assure that VAT has been paid, we can either track the supply or track the money.
Tradition has been to track supplies through invoice records. There has always been another way
to do this – a direct tracking of the VAT. Until recently, this approach has not been workable.
However, a crypto-tax-currency (VATCoin) makes this possible.63
An ideal system tracks both, and each should be internally secured on independent
blockchains. These blockchains will interlock through a fiscalized notation on the digital
invoice.
Without a digital invoice mandate that allows AI risk analysis and oversight, the EU has
struggled with supply-end frauds whenever the EU has had to track large numbers of transactions
along complex supply chains. Indirectly tracking VAT by following supplies as they pass from
one party to another has proven to be so difficult with a mix of digital and paper invoices that the
EU has begun to look seriously at directly tracking the VAT.
The EU is considering directly tracking through VATCoin. In a large, multijurisdictional
system like the EU, this approach utilizes blockchain to not only preserve a comprehensive, realtime record of tax payments throughout a supply chain, but also to facilitate information
exchange.64

Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohabi & Mike Cheetham, VATCoin: Can a Crypto Tax Currency Prevent VAT
Fraud? 84 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 703 (November 16, 2016); Richard T. Ainsworth & Brendan Magauran,
Taxing and Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance and Trump (Part 4), 89 STATE TAX NOTES 39 (July 2,
2018); Richard T. Ainsworth & Brendan Magauran, Taxing and Zapping Marijuana: Blockchain Compliance and
Trump (Part 5), 89 STATE TAX NOTES 157 (July 9, 2018).
64 Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi, Mike Cheetham & Camille Tirand, A VATCoin Solution to MTIC
Fraud: Past Efforts, Present Technology and the EU’s 2017 Proposal, 89 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 335
(January 22, 2018); European Court of Auditors, Special Report, No. 12 (July 3, 2019), E-commerce: many of the
challenges of collecting VAT and customs duties remain to be resolved, at 44, available at:
https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/sr19_12/sr_e-commerce_vulnerability_to_tax_fraud_en.pdf. Marie
Lamensch, Study on: VAT Fraud: Economic Impact, Challenges and Policy Issues (Requested by the TAX3
Committee, European Parliament) (October 15, 2018) at 52, 62, & 65, available at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/156408/VAT%20Fraud%20Study%20publication.pdf
63
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VATCoin is a limited purpose crypto-tax-currency. It is issued on demand by the
government, and is usable for very limited-purposes (primarily for paying VAT, for which its use
is mandatory). It is convertible into fiat currency only by the state that minted it. 65
Figure 9 illustrates the interlocking relationship among a simple chain of fiscal invoices
and the VATCoin. The Figure 9 diagram is broken into a series of illustrations [9a; 9b; 9c; and
9d], to isolate important issues. It is assembled in full [9e] at the end of this section. What
makes this discussion (and the related Figures) so complicated is that we are dealing with two
comprehensive fraud-preventing systems, not one. Both fiscal invoices and the VATCoin
system are (independently) effective barriers against VAT fraud. They are, however, far more
effective when deployed together. They are interlocking.
Fiscal invoices (alone) will accurately determine VAT, and provide a comprehensive,
verifiable data base of transactions, limited only by efforts to “fully circumvent.”66 It does not
collect or secure the VAT that’s due. VATCoin does that.
VATCoin, likewise, has vulnerabilities. It is vulnerable to deliberate under reporting of
transactions, something that may happen in markets where there is an active smuggling trade.
Examples include trade in gold and gold jewelry, cigarettes, marijuana, liquor, or other regulated
products, but would also include commodities sold in bulk like computer chips or even bushels
of corn.
Suppose two businesses agree to exchange £50,000 worth of hand-crafted gold jewelry
for £10. It would not matter if the 20% VAT was collected in £2 fiat currency or two UKVATCoins. Switching to VATCoin would not detect the fraud.
The technology of fiscal invoices would uncover the deception here, VATCoin would
not. If a tax authority is able to put an AI risk assessment program on top of a comprehensive
data steam of the related transactions in the hand-crafted gold jewelry marketplace, the fraud
would be found. VATCoin is very good at collecting all the VAT that is paid. It is just not so
good at determining if the amount paid is the amount due (in real-time).
Figure 9 (in the series below) illustrates the joint application of fiscal invoices and
VATCoin in a market where smuggling is a concern. Figure 9 reads generally from left to right.
The example assumes a major UK cigarette importer (A) sells on to a U.K. middleman
operating a general warehouse (B) who in turn supplies a number of local U.K. retailers, one of
whom is (C). Retailers sell directly to U.K. final consumers. The middleman supplies a variety
of goods, mostly to convenience stores, and does not specialize in tobacco products. For
simplicity the VAT rate is assumed to be 10%. This market segment was chosen because of the
Some of the most difficult VATCoin applications are reserved for the forthcoming paper, VATCoin: Step-by-Step,
which will take up cross-border supplies within and without an economic community, as well as transactions in
goods and remotely supplied services through electronic marketplaces (Amazon, Alibaba, eBay, etc.).
66 Fiscalized invoices cannot resolve issues created by transactions that are not entered into the AIS/POS. For
example, in the current case, if cigarettes are smuggled from a foreign supply without passing through customs, or
any domestic invoicing mechanisms, it unlikely that these supplies will be picked up either through fiscalization or
through a VATCoin application.
65
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high incidence of cigarette smuggling in both the U.K. and KSA.67 For each entity (A), (B), and
(C), the example presents only the first seven fiscalized invoices within their mini-blockchains.
In real life there would be many more invoices to deal with.
Further, the example assumes that (A) properly imports (and invoices) cigarettes, and that
(B) properly distributes (and invoices) them on re-sale, but that certain criminal elements in (C),
when purchasing cigarettes from (B), arrange with associates in (B) for the invoices to go
“missing,” or be unreported in the accounting system. If questioned, the accounting department
in (B) has agreed to tell authorities that the reason it receives large shipments of cigarettes from
(A), but apparently makes only a small number of cigarette re-sales from inventory is that the
majority of (B’s) cigarette business is conducted as a forwarding agent on (A’s) behalf. Thus (B)
forwards (but does not sell) large numbers of cigarettes to (C) and to others.
Individuals at (C) on the other hand, plan on telling the authorities (if asked) that all of its
re-sale inventory is purchased directly from (B), and will have several small invoices on hand to
back up their claim. This answer would most likely result in sending tax officials back to (A) in
search of the non-existent direct cigarette sales from (A) to (C) that were (allegedly) forwarded
through (B).
This scam is most likely part of a wider smuggling effort where (B) and (C) are also
receiving cigarettes directly from foreign smugglers. This scam may have worked very well
when all invoices were paper, and compliance was undertaken by hand. The full stream of
illegal cigarettes is not considered here. We have previously analyzed this alternate scenario.68
Overall, this fact pattern is part of an effort by criminal elements in (B) and (C) to
accumulate a large inventory of low-taxed/ not-taxed cigarettes for sale into the black market.
They seek to do this without leaving a clear trail of where their inventory came from.
(A) Cigarette importer. In Figure 9a, at [1], the cigarette importer (A) receives a
shipment of 1,000,000 cartons of cigarettes at Customs that requires the payment of £1,000 in
VAT, excise tax and customs duties. 69 (A) secures UK-VATCoin to pay all taxes and duties at
the external border. To do this, £1,000 in fiat currency is exchanged for an equivalent amount in
UK-VATCoin at the UK Treasury, which “mints” the coins in its secure cloud [2].

Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT: GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695, 716-19 (May 22, 2017) (considering cigarette smuggling in the GCC). Tobacco
Manufacturers’ Association, Tobacco Taxation in the UK, (February, 2017) available at: http://www.thetma.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TMA-Taxation_Briefing_final.pdf (indicating that the UK lost £3.0 billion
to cigarette smuggling and fraud in 2015-16). Luk Joossens & Martin Raw, From Cigarette Smuggling to Illicit
Tobacco Trade 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 230 (March 2012) (explaining how tax frauds and inability of tax authorities
to effectively audit tobacco products compounded by gaps in technical skills is what accelerate illicit tobacco trade).
Nasser Saidi & Associates, Taxation, Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and Finance of Terrorism (June 2015),
available at: http://www.thecre.com/ccsf/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tax-Illicit-Trade-and-Terrorism-June-2015Final-English-Version.pdf (discussing cigarette smuggling and tax avoidance in the KSA).
68 Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT: GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695, 716-19 (May 22, 2017)
69 For purposes of this example 1,000,000 cartons of cigarettes cost £10,000, and incurs VAT of £1,000. All other
prices follow these ratios.
67
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This cryptocurrency transaction is recorded on UK Treasury’s VATCoin blockchain, and
will include a reference to the underlying Customs documentation [3].70 The Customs
documentation, functioning like an invoice, is fiscalized through the TaxCore’s secure element.
It will have a QR Code that allows immediate verification of the import and tax payments.
Fiscalization occurs immediately upon Custom’s receipt of the UK-VATCoins. Based upon the
time of completion, this record is stored in a block on the UK-VATCoin blockchain, and will be
followed throughout the tax system on this blockchain.
The £1,000 in UK-VATCoin will be returned to the UK Treasury after HMRC settles all
accounts on the importation. The coins will then be returned to the Treasury’s cloud and taken
permanently out of circulation (destroyed) [5].

Figure 9b (below) focuses on one of (A)’s invoices, (A-2). This is the second invoice
issued by (A) in this sequence. It is fiscalized in the normal manner. Through the (A-2)
transaction (A) transfers to (B) 750,000 of the 1,000,000 cartons of cigarettes it imports.
Transaction data, with a request for fiscalization has been sent by A’s Accredited Invoice System
(AIS) to the Secure Element (SE) in the TaxCore.
The TaxCore replies with a fiscal invoice [6]. The (A-2) invoice now includes an
embedded reference to the specific 750 UK-VATCoins used by (B) to complete this transaction
[7]. (B) secured the 750 UK-VATCoin by taking £750 in fiat currency to the UK Treasury
In the UK the form which acts like a bill for both import duty and import VAT is a Form C88. It is a single
administrative document, and can be found at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/374258/c88status.pdf
70
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where it was exchanged for 750 UK-VATCoin [8]. The minting of 750 UK-VATCoin (B) is
immediately lodged in the UK-VATCoin blockchain [9]. (B) is provided a copy of the
completed and fiscalized (A-2) invoice [10].
At [11] invoice (A-2) is highlighted within A’s mini-blockchain. (A-2)’s content is
immediately verifiable through its QR code, and can be confirmed through operation of the
counters. Its content includes a reference to the specific 750 UK-VATCoin used. This data is
permanent and immutable.
When (A) files a VAT return, at [12], that includes the data on invoice (A-2), the 750
UK-VATCoin are simultaneously transferred to HMRC, recorded in the Tax Core, and then
further transferred to the UK Treasury (after a review of the return for completeness). The
Treasury transfers the VATCoin to its cloud where they are destroyed [13]. Complete data of the
journey of A-2’s 750 UK-VATCoins is preserved on UK Treasury’s VATCoin blockchain.

(B) General warehouse and freight forwarder. See Figure 9c (below). All of (B)’s sales
transactions are fiscalized at [14] through the standard request and reply format with the request
sent automatically by the AIS, and the fiscalized reply returned by the TaxCore’s SE. (B)’s
invoices are linked in a mini-blockchain [15]. However, when (B)’s VAT return is filed three
invoices are missing (B-3; B-4 and B-5), and as a result the return is set aside for audit [16].
We know (although a traditional auditor might not) that the missing (B-4) invoice is the
vehicle that transfers to (C) 500,000 of the 750,000 cartons of cigarettes that (B) had acquired
from (A) through invoice (A-2). A copy of the missing invoice is preserved in the TaxCore, so
in a fiscalized system we know more than what the traditional auditor knows. We also know that
the missing (B-3) and (B-5) invoices are for smaller amounts and are with other retailers.
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How would a traditional, non-tech auditor approach these missing invoices? How would
the auditor determine if the missing (B-4) invoice is just a mistake, or if it is evidence that a large
number of cigarettes are headed for the black market? UK revenue losses from tobacco sales
(year-in and year-out) approximates £3.0 billion annually.71 A traditional audit approach would
be to sample the onward sales of (C) and other retailers who were supplied by (B) to see where
the cigarettes went.
Assume a sampling of (C)’s odd-numbered invoices (C-1; C-3; C-5; and C-7) shows that
(C) almost always sells cigarettes one-pack-at-a-time. There is no indication of any large
volume cigarette sales by (C) that could be associated with the missing (B-4) invoice. Proving
anything more would be time consuming, even though uncovering it may well account for a
good portion of the cigarette “leakage” moving into the UK black market.
A tech-audit would be more revealing. Because each of the (B-1) through (B-7) invoices
are fiscalized, there is a copy of each lodged in the TaxCore. This includes the three missing
invoices. The data shows that the three missing invoices each involve large volume sales,
although (B-4) contained the largest.
A fiscalized system would show that retailer (C) purchased from (B) 500,000 cartons of
cigarettes for £5,000 plus 500 UK-VATCoins. (C) secured the UK-VATCoins by exchanging
£500 for 500 UK-VATCoins at the UK Treasury [17]. This transaction was lodged on the UK’s
VATCoin blockchain [18].
This data is not only saved on the mini-blockchain [15], but it is embedded in the QR
code placed on the (B-4) invoice, a copy of which is presented to (C), at the time of the sale [19].

Tax losses from tobacco products has been reasonably consistent over time, see the series of annual reports:
HMRC, Measuring tax gaps, tobacco tax gap estimates for 2015-16 and the same report for 2017-2018 at 39
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/820979/Measurin
g_tax_gaps_2019_edition.pdf
71
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When (B) goes to file its VAT return it should be alert to potential problems. Not only is
it missing three substantial invoices, it is in possession of 500 UK-VATCoins that should be
associated with the return. (B) must decide what to do with the 500 UK-VATCoins it received
from (C). There are three options, each of which will certainly raise “red flags” in a fiscalized
system (but not necessarily in a traditional system):
(1) If the 500 VATCoins attributed to the (B-4) invoice are generally submitted along
with the return a “red flag” will be raised in the TaxCore. These 500 UK-VATCoins are
expressly associated with a missing invoice. An automated demand for the missing
invoice will issue.
(2) If (B) holds back the 500 UK-VATCoins to use them as a payment received in a
different transaction, the UK-VATCoin blockchain at the UK Treasury will send up a
“red flag.” Fiscalized invoices identify the specific VATCoins used for VAT payment,
and there will not be a match. An automated demand for clarification will issue.
(3) If the 500 UK-VATCoins are never sent to HMRC and never passed on to the UK
Treasury a “time-in-circulation” warning will be raised, because no activity has been
recorded on these VATCoins in the UK-VATCoin blockchain since their minting [17]
and their delivery to (B) [19]. An automated inquiry asking about the status of these UKVATCoins will issue.
Regardless of the decision above, the 500 UK-VATCoin, if they are remitted to HMRC,
will not be transferred to the UK Treasury, nor will they be transferred to the UK Treasury’s
secure cloud and removed from circulation (at least until HMRC resolves this case) [21]. Recall,
in a VATCoin system however, that the tax itself is already collected and deposited. £500 in fiat
currency was presented to the UK Treasury by (C) at [17].
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In addition, because the VATCoin system interlocks with fiscal invoices, the invoice
sequencing will also be issuing audit warnings. If the (B-3), (B-4), and (B-5) invoices were
deliberately suppressed, or “zapped” out of the underlying AIS system, of if they were just “lost”
somehow, then when invoice (B-6) is fiscalized the automatic proof of audit request will return a
“failed audit” notice. Another “failed audit” notice will issue both to (B) and the HMRC after
the (B-7) invoice is fiscalized.
In fact, if the missing invoices are not entered into the database, each invoice fiscalized
after (B-5) will fail proof of audit until the caps on one or more counters are exceeded. The caps
will force the fiscalization system to close down, and direct the tax administration to open an
audit of (B). Without a reset, (B) will not be able to issue valid invoices (fines and penalties
should apply if that is attempted).
(C) Retailer selling to final consumers. In this final section, dividing the analysis into
three parts is helpful: (a) the sales data on the fiscalized invoices in the mini-blockchain; (b) the
UK-VATCoin data retained on the Treasury’s VATCoin blockchain; and (c) the VAT return that
(C) will file, and all other communications with HMRC. See Figure 9d (below).

The sales data & mini-blockchain. All of (C’s) sales transactions are fiscalized at [22] in
the standard request and reply format with the request sent automatically by (C)’s POS,72 and the
fiscalized reply returned by the TaxCore’s SE. (C)’s invoices are linked in a mini-blockchain
[23]. Because each invoice is fiscalized, and each invoice passes proof of audit, HMRC can be
reasonably sure it has captured all of (C)’s output data.
The designation POS (Point of Sale) system is used here instead of AIS (Authorized Invoicing System), because C
is selling to final consumers (B2C) in a retail setting, not a commercial (B2B) setting.
72

33
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574381

UK-VATCoin & the Treasury’s VATCoin blockchain. In terms of the UK-VATCoins,
consumers purchased cigarettes at £10 per pack and secure one UK-VATCoin from the UK
Treasury each time they do so, paying over £10 plus 1 UK-VATCoin for each pack. Consumers
probably go on-line, use an app, or access a service provided by a credit card company to get the
UK-VATCoins [24]. Total revenue collected from all sales invoices is seven UK-VATCoins.
These transactions are lodged on the UK VATCoin blockchain [25].
The seven UK-VATCoins will be remitted to HMRC with the VAT return [26], sent on
to the UK Treasury, and then to the UK Treasury’s secure cloud where the VATCoins are decommissioned [28].
The VAT return & HMRC communications. The fiscalized invoice and VATCoin
technologies deployed in this example are not intended to be static. They are essential parts of a
highly dynamic VAT ecosystem. Critical to HMRC’s VAT enforcement is their use of risk
analyzing AI scanning blockchain data bases.
As (C) composes its VAT return it needs to consider its purchase of 500,000 cartons of
cigarettes from (B), as well as the 500 UK-VATCoins it sent to (C). Should the VATCoins be
deducted? This may depend in part on how (B) is filing its return.
In a traditional VAT enforcement regime, (C) might perceive different fraud options.
The purchase of 500,000 cartons of cigarettes might not have been honestly represented on an
invoice, and the VAT paid might have been significantly less than the full £500, because (C) in
cooperation with (B) and others might be planning to use a minimalist transaction to provide the
cover they needed while moving the cigarettes into the black market. HMRC would be chasing
fraudsters after the fact.
In a fiscal invoice and VATCoin system HMRC should be pro-active. Once it identifies
that 500 UK-VATCoins have been received by B, but are associated with a “missing” invoice for
500,000 cartons of cigarettes (none of which have apparently been re-sold to consumers), HMRC
should open up an automated communication channel with both (B) and (C). HMRC should ask
if a copy of the B-4 invoice has been located, and if so whether the QR code could be scanned so
that the invoice would be entered into the HMRC data base acknowledging its’ recovery.
HMRC could make this request in the context of trying to satisfy a proof of audit command, but
the subliminal compliance message would be unmistakably clear: (a) HMRC is aware of the
transaction in detail (see the mini-blockchain), and (b) HMRC already has possession of the
VAT that is due (see the VATCoin blockchain).
The entire set of transactions are presented in Figure 9e (below).
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CONCLUSION
Figure 9 appears to be where the UK and KSA are headed. Both need to mandate digital
invoices, and both need fiscalize them in the same manner as Fiji, Samoa, Rwanda and possibly
New Zealand. A VATCoin regime is just as important. It is critical to be able to determine in
near real-time both (a) how much VAT is due (fiscal invoicing), and then to be able to (b)
quickly collect it (VATCoin). The systems need to interlock.
Fiscal invoices have been around for some time to help determine the VAT that’s due. It
is a highly efficient, tech-secure, self-auditing system that has a low installation and maintenance
cost profile. The KSA and UK also need to adopt another, relatively new, concept, the
VATCoin. In many senses VATCoin is simply a high-tech permutation of the traditionally
proposed “split payments” model. It is lodged in a far more secure space of cryptocurrencies and
blockchain, but it is just as important as fiscal invoices. In light of this necessary development
path, it is interesting to note how the UK is responding to “split payments.”
In the 2018 budget, a working group of government and industry experts was set
up to review a UK split payments model. This month, HMRC said: “We are seeking
to design a VAT collection mechanism that could reduce fraud and potentially
revolutionize how UK VAT is collected.”73
Could the UK be considering VATCoin?

Richard Asquith, Super Sales Tax Tuesday - U.S. transformation a global phenomenon, at UK to take the
European lead? ACCOUNTANCYAGE (September 12, 2019) available at:
https://www.accountancyage.com/2019/09/12/super-sales-tax-tuesday-u-s-transformation-a-global-phenomenon/
73
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But it is also important to see how the KSA and the UAE may be further down the road
to VATCoin, particularly in a cross-border (blockchain) context, according to SAMA:
Saudi Arabia and the UAE will finalize the pilot operations of the digital
currency for cross-border bank transactions by year-end [2019], ... The pilot
operations will likely focus on the technical aspects. .... legal and economic aspects
will be examined at a later stage.
In January [2019], SAMA and the United Arab Emirates Central Bank
(UAECB) launched Aber, a joint digital currency project to facilitate trans-border
settlement between the two countries.
Under a proof-of-concept framework, both central banks aim to explore the
use of Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers technologies in issuing a common
digital currency for use across borders to carry out remittances. 74
Events are clearly moving faster than some tax authorities realize, but technological advances
will not wait for the unsure and the hesitant. Sooner or later we will all be trying to catch up to
the UK and the KSA.

Staff writer, Saudi Arabia, UAE to finalize cryptocurrency pilot ops by year-end: SAMA, ARGAAM (September 9,
2019) available at: http://bit.ly/2N9fWkw
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